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Abstract
We develop a principal-agent model with a moral hazard problem in which the principal has access
to a hard signal (the level of output) and a soft signal (the supervision signal) about the agents level of
e¤ort. We show that the agents ability to manipulate the soft signal increases the cost of implementing
the e¢ cient equilibrium, leading to wage compression when the inuence cost is privately incurred by
the agent. When manipulation activities negatively a¤ect the agents productivity through the level of
output, the design of inuence-free contracts that deter manipulation may lead to high-powered incen-
tives. This result implies that high-productivity workers face incentive schemes that are more sensitive
to hard evidence than those faced by their low-productivity counterparts. In that context, the principal
will tolerate inuence for low-productivity workers but not for high-productivity workers. We also nd
that in the case of productivity-based costs, it may be optimal for the principal not to supervise the
agent, even if supervision is costless (JEL D23, D82).
Keywords: principal-agent model with supervision, contract design, inuence activities, manipulation,
productivity-based inuence costs, power of incentives.
1 Introduction
Recent nancial scandals including the Mado¤s case of felony and the distortion of budget gures by the
Greek government, raise the question of the manipulability of information. In this article we study this issue
in a principal-agent setup, in which the agent is given the possibility to inuence the principals evaluation
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of his work by manipulating certain pieces of information through the use of inuence activities that distort
the principals evaluation of his performance if the principal engages in supervision.1
A comprehensive analysis of the manipulability of information requires a precise understanding of the
relation between the concepts of hard and soft information. In the nance literature, hard information is
dened as being quantitative (Berger et al., 2001; Stein, 2002; Petersen, 2004; Liberti and Mian, 2009). Hard
information is assumed to be easy to store, to be transmitted in impersonal ways and to be independent of
the collection process; all these features making it a priori di¢ cult for hard information to be manipulated.
Further, research on supervision and delegation in principal-agent models refer to hard information as being
veriable (Tirole, 1986) whereas soft information is considered to be unveriable (Baliga, 1999; Faure-
Grimaud, La¤ont and Martimort, 2003). In these models, a signal is unveriable whenever it cannot be
observed by a third party (the "judge"). Manipulability of information implies that soft information can be
distorted whereas hard information can simply be hidden.
In the current article, we consider a principal-agent model, in which the principal has access to both,
hard and soft information about the agents level of e¤ort. We assume that hard information cannot be
manipulated whereas soft information is subject to manipulation attempts. In our framework, agents do not
distort or hide their own pieces of information but undertake inuence activities in order to manipulate the
soft signal collected by the principal. This way of modeling inuence is related to the work of Mullainathan,
Schwartzstein and Shlei¤er (2008) who model the concept of associative thinking. In their framework,
individuals classify situations into categories, and transfer the informational content of a given signal from
situations in a category where it is useful to those where it is not.2 Applying this concept to our model, the
principal who dedicates time to monitor the agent will nd it di¢ cult to distinguish the following positive
pieces of information "The agent is a hard-working (good) employee" and "The agent is a good person". These
pieces of information belong to two di¤erent categories, work abilities and personality, and the di¢ culty for
the principal is to disentangle signals that concern the contribution of their employee to the rm and the ones
that relate to personal characteristics. Specically, we model inuence as a reduced form of coarse thinking
by considering that the principal su¤ers from biased information processing à la Bénabou and Tirole (2002).
As a result, the principal may misperceive a negative soft signal about the level of e¤ort of the agent as
being positive.3
1Hereafter, we use the feminine pronouns for the principal and masculine for the agent.
2Persuasion has also been modeled using an informational approach (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Dewatripont and Tirole,
1999).
3Although our model of manipulation is closely related to the analysis of inuence activities in the organizational literature,
an alternative interpretation of our model is related to the distortion of quantitative information (e.g., documents falsication).
2
The consideration of both hard and soft signals relates our analysis to the literature on subjective evalua-
tions (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 1994; MacLeod, 2003). In our model, similarly to the analysis developed
in Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994), the principal can propose contingent contracts that depend on a
hard signal (determined by the level of production) as well as on a soft signal, which provides additional
information about the level of e¤ort of the agent. However, in contrast with the model of Baker, Gibbons
and Murphy (1994) and the general framework of MacLeod (2003), we assume that both the principal and
the agent agree on the value of the soft signal so that the signal can be treated as if it were veriable. As a
result, we can disentangle the issues related to the unveriability of subjective evaluations (MacLeod, 2003)
from the issues related to the manipulability of such evaluations.
1.1 The costs and benets of inuence activities
Inuence activities have been identied as actions completed by organizational members in order to bias the
decisions of managers toward more pay and promotions (Milgrom, 1988; Milgrom and Roberts, 1988, 1992).4
As a general principle, this analysis suggests that inuence costs can be reduced by limiting the discretion
of decision makers for those decisions that have a signicant impact on the distribution of rents inside the
organizations but that have minor impact on the rms prots.5
In our model, we focus on optimal contracts rather than organizational design as a mechanism to reduce
inuence costs. Specically, we derive incentive contracts that implement the high level of e¤ort by the
agent (hereafter, we refer to this e¤ort as the e¢ cient level of e¤ort). We assume that inuence activities
are unveriable so that the principal cannot prevent inuence simply by punishing attempts to manipulate
soft signals. In our model, inuence activities tend to reduce aggregate welfare by increasing information
asymmetry between principal and agent. As a result, the agents ability to manipulate the soft signal
increases the cost of implementing the e¢ cient level of e¤ort.
Our approach di¤ers from the model developed by Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1995) in which agents
can distort the principals private information in order to reduce information asymmetry. In their setting,
information distortion may actually allow for the falsication of information in equilibrium, and as a result,
may increase aggregate welfare. Relatedly, Lacker and Weinberg (1989) consider a sharecropping model
In this paper, we do not focus on the latter interpretation, although the majority of our results can be interpreted from this
perspective.
4Also, notice that inuence costs have been considered as a key element of the theory of the rm (Gibbons, 2005).
5Milgrom (1988) also mentions the use of compensation schemes as one of the possible instruments with which to reduce
inuence activities. In particular, the author puts forward that the compression of wage di¤erentials between current jobs and
promotion jobs is an e¤ective strategy for reducing incentives to inuence the managers promotion decision.
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which focus on optimal risk-sharing when agents have the possibility to misreport the volume of the crop.
The authors nd that, in general, the principal should induce some misreporting in equilibrium in order to
improve risk-sharing.
1.2 Incentive Schemes under Inuence
We rst characterize the optimal contracts when inuence costs are privately incurred by the agent. We show
that the cost of implementing the e¢ cient equilibrium increases as the soft signal becomes more manipulable
and inuence activities are more pervasive. This occurs because in the presence of inuence activities the
principal relies on less informative signals and must, as a result, increase the variance of wages in order to
keep incentives intact. This implies that a larger rent will have to be paid to the risk-averse agent in order
to ensure that the participation constraint holds. This result follows from Kim (1995) after showing that
the e¢ ciency of the information structure decreases in the manipulability of the soft signal.
We also show that optimal wages become more compressed and less volatile as the soft signal becomes
more manipulable. In addition, more weight is given to the hard signal in the payment scheme in the
presence of highly manipulable soft signals. These results are closely related to the su¢ cient statistic theorem
(Holmström, 1979; Banker and Datar, 1989) in which incentive contracts must include all the signals that
are informative about the agents level of e¤ort. Indeed, incentive schemes will be less responsive to the
soft signal as it becomes more manipulable (and therefore less informative). Given that wages are less
responsive to the soft signal, both the range of possible wages as well as the variance of wages decrease.
This nding is related to the result established in MacLeod (2003) in which wage compression occurs when
the measures of agent performance are subjective. However, the mechanism behind wage compression in
MacLeod (2003) is di¤erent from ours. In the previous model, wage compression follows from the fact
that subjective evaluations are unveriable so that the optimization problem of the principal includes the
additional constraint that both the agent and the principal truthfully reveal their private signals. Wage
compression is also present in the model of inuence activities in promotion decisions of Milgrom (1988) in
which the reduction in wage di¤erentials between available jobs is found to be an optimal response against
inuence activities.
1.3 Optimal Contracts and the Value of the Firm
We extend our analysis to the case in which inuence activities entail costs in terms of the rm productive
activities as is suggested by the initial denition in Milgrom (1988).
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"That time of course is valuable; if it were not wasted in inuence activities, it could be used for
directly productive activities or simply consumed as leisure."
In this context of productivity-based inuence costs, the principal will have to choose between accepting
some inuence activities in equilibrium or designing inuence-free contracts that eliminate manipulation
attempts. In our framework, we must emphasize that not all optimal contracts can be replicated by inuence-
free contracts for which agents have no incentives to inuence the principal. To understand why an inuence-
proof principle does not apply let us consider the situation in which the cost for employees of initiating
inuence activities is arbitrarily close to zero. In that case inuence-free contracts would only consist of a
xed wage. The xed wage contract is the only type of contract that fully eliminates the agents incentives
to boost his actual contribution. However, xed wage contracts do not satisfy the incentive-compatibility
constraint since in this case the agent would not exert the high level of e¤ort in equilibrium. Therefore,
inuence-free contracts cannot always implement the e¢ cient equilibrium.
The design of inuence-free contracts relies on two possible strategies to dissuade inuence activities. The
rst one consists of designing incentive contracts that are less responsive to the soft signal so as to reduce
the expected benets associated with inuence activities. This rst strategy would induce even greater wage
compression and weaker incentives in the case of productivity-based inuence costs than in the case of private
inuence costs. This follows from the fact that the cost of initiating inuence activities is lower for the agent
when it is not privately incurred, making the manipulation of soft signals potentially more appealing. As
a result, under this strategy, inuence-free contracts are likely to induce low-powered incentives and a low
level of e¤ort.
The second strategy, which is actually followed by the principal in equilibrium, consists of increasing
the opportunity cost associated with inuence activities by increasing the incentives associated with the
hard signal. In that case, inuence activities become less attractive as they reduce the probability that the
agent will get the high payment associated with a high level of performance on the hard signal. As a result
of this second strategy, the principal may be willing to design high-powered incentives contracts to deter
inuence activities. More specically, we show that high-powered incentives and inuence-free contracts are
more likely to be o¤ered to high-productivity agents for which inuence is especially costly in terms of rm
productivity than to low-productivity agents. Also, we show that the incentive contracts of high-productivity
agents tend to be more responsive to the hard signal compared with low-productivity agents.
Finally, we show that, in the case of productivity-based inuence costs, the principal may decide not to
supervise the agent in equilibrium, even though supervision is costless. This is the case because, in our
setting, supervision gives the agent the opportunity to engage in destructive inuence activities.
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In this version of our model, the substitutability between hard and soft information follows from the fact
that improving the soft signal through inuence activities is detrimental to the value of the hard signal. It
is interesting to note that the mechanism underlying the substitutability between the two types of signals
di¤ers from our model with private inuence costs. In the model with private inuence costs as well as in
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994), the substitutability between signals follows from the fact that highly
precise hard signals are su¢ cient to ensure the implementation of the e¢ cient equilibrium independently of
the reception of soft signals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present our model in the case of rational supervisors
in Section 2 and solve the corresponding model in Section 3. The analysis of the model with inuence is
developed in Section 4. We extend our model for the case in which the inuence activity is costly for the
organization in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6. All proofs are available in the appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Description of Actions and Payo¤s
We consider a principal-agent model with three stages described as follows.
 In Stage 1, the principal [she] sets a contract w that will be used to pay the agent [he] in the last stage
of the game. The contract is contingent on the level of production in the organization y 2 Y := f0; 1g,
which yields revenues R(y) for the principal, where R(1) > R(0)  0: This level of production is a hard
and non-manipulable signal of the agents level of e¤ort.
In Stage 1, the principal also decides whether to engage in supervising the agent (s = 1) or not (s = 0)
in order to obtain the additional signal (v) about the agents level of e¤ort.6 The contract can be
made contingent on this supervision signal v 2 V := fB;Gg which costs s  0 to the principal
and it is collected in Stage 3. This piece of information can be interpreted as a soft signal about the
employees performance where B means: the agent is a lazy (bad) employee and G means: the agent
is a hard-working (good) employee.
 In Stage 2, the agent decides whether to exert a high level of e¤ort (e = eH) or a low level of e¤ort
(e = eL) on a productive task, where eH > eL. The level of e¤ort (e) exerted by the agent on the
productive task a¤ects the level of production in the organization (y). The cost of e¤ort on the
6This part of the game resembles models of costly acquisition of additional signals (Lambert, 1985).
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productive task is denoted by  (e)  0. We denote e :=  (eH) > 0 and without loss of generality
assume that  (eL) = 0.
In Stage 2, the agent also decides whether to undertake an inuence activity (a = 1) or not (a = 0). The
private cost of e¤ort associated with inuence activities is denoted by (a)  0; where a :=  (1) > 0
and  (0) = 0.
The objective of the inuence activity is to a¤ect the evaluation of the principal with regard to the
agents actual level of e¤ort by distorting the principals perception (vs) of the supervision signal (v).
Our model builds on the idea that if the principal engages in supervision in Stage 1 and the agent
undertakes inuence activities then she will not necessarily observe the true value of the supervision
signal v. Instead, the principal will observe vs which refers to the principals, possibly erroneous,
perception of the true signal.7
 In Stage 3, the principal cannot observe the level of e¤ort on the productive task. However, the principal
observes the level of production as well as the supervision signal if the principal decided to supervise the
agent. The principal then pays the agent according to the contract chosen in Stage 1: We assume that
the level of output (y) satises the condition that P [y = 0 j e = eL] = P [y = 1 j e = eH ] = y, where
the precision of the hard signal is denoted by y 2

1
2 ; 1

. It is assumed that the supervision signal
when there is no inuence from the agent (i.e. vs := v) satises the condition that P [v = B j e = eL] =
P [v = G j e = eH ] = v, where the precision of the soft signal is denoted by v 2

1
2 ; 1

.
Our model can be summarized as follows:
The nal payo¤ for the principal is determined as follows.
7The supervision signal can then be interpreted either as subjective evaluation of the supervisor or as quantitative information
about the performance of the agent.
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UP := U(s; vs; w; y) = R(y) wyvs ss; where y 2 f0; 1g indicates the level of production and s 2 f0; 1g
denotes whether supervision takes place (s = 1) or not (s = 0).
The nal payo¤ for the risk-averse agent is determined as follows.
UA := U(a; e; vs; w) = u(wyvs)   (e)   (a) > 0 where u0 > " > 0, u00 < 0.8
We denote u > 0 the agents outside option and wyvs2 R stands for the wage paid to the agent contingently
on receiving signals y and vs.9
After presenting the structure of our model we detail our assumptions as follows.
2.2 Assumptions
The principal does not directly observe the level of e¤ort of the agent on the productive task, e 2 feL; eHg
but she receives a hard signal on the level of e¤ort by observing output (y). The principal may obtain an
additional signal about the performance of her subordinate by engaging in supervision activities at a cost.
We assume that the supervisors perception of the soft signal (vs) can be manipulated by inuence activities
(a). We model the inuence of the agent on his supervisors assessments as a case of biased attribution
(Bénabou and Tirole, 2002) in which the principal may mistakenly perceive a negative signal about her
employee as being positive as a result of inuence activities. This biased attribution process can be related
to the concept of transference for which the characteristic of an agent as a person is associated with his
quality as an employee even though in our context being a good person is not informative about being a
good employee (Mullainathan, Schwartzstein and Schlei¤er, 2008).10 In the following assumption, we refer
to  2 [0; 1] as the bias of the principal. In line with Bénabou and Tirole (2002), we consider that the
principal and the agent are fully aware of the bias of the principal. We state these assumptions as follows.
Assumption I (Inuence)
If the agent decides to undertake an inuence activity in Stage 2 ( a = 1), then the principal will
perceive with probability  2 [0; 1] any soft signal as if it were good.
With probability (1  ) the principal uses standard Bayesian updating.
In the case of a rational supervisor,  = 0 so that vs := v.
8We assume that the utility of the agent is separable in e¤ort and in the inuence cost as used for example in MacLeod
(2003).
9We abuse notation and assume that if the agent is not being supervised then vs = f?g. This does not mean that the soft
signal v can take neutral values.
10We can also think of trust and positive reciprocity as important factors in explaining the supervisors biased perception of
the performance of the agent in the presence of inuence activities (see Hosmer, 1995).
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The bias of the principal  2 [0; 1] captures the di¢ culty of the supervisor to disentangle positive inuence
behaviors (a = 1) from positive soft signals (v = G). Clearly the existence of this bias creates incentives for
the agent to manipulate the soft signal through inuence activities.11
Assumption A (Awareness of Biases)
Let e^ denotes the level of e¤ort implemented by the principal in equilibrium. The principal updates
her belief about the soft signal as follows:8>>><>>>:
P [v = G j vs = G; e^ = eH ] = v(1 v)+v
P [v = G j vs = G; e^ = eL] = 1 v(1 v)+v
P [v = Gjvs = B; e^] = 0
This assumption is used in Bénabou and Tirole (2002) and is referred to as metacognition. Under this
assumption, the principal knows that perceiving her employee positively (vs = G) may not systematically
imply that the soft signal was positive given that, with probability , the principal being under the inuence
of the agent (a = 1) always perceives the soft signal positively.
One important feature of our model concerns the contractibility of the inuence activity. We clarify this
point in Assumption O.
Assumption O (Observability of actions and signals)
i) The inuence activity ( a 2 f0; 1g) is observed by the supervisor but it is not veriable.
ii) The supervision signal vs is observable by both the agent and the principal.
The rst part of Assumption O states that the inuence activity is unveriable by a third party implying
that incentive contracts cannot be contingent on the observed action a 2 f0; 1g. For example, if you
undertake an inuence activity and invite your boss for a co¤ee (a = 1) she will naturally observe this action
but she will not be able to write any incentives contract using this piece of information.12 The second part
of Assumption O implies that both the principal and the agent agree on the value of signal vs so that the
supervision signal can be treated as if it were veriable (See MacLeod, 2003).13 These features of our model
11 Inuence activities could also be interpreted as, for example, document falsication. In that case, the value of  2 [0; 1]
would be interpreted as the agents ability to falsify the signal.
12Also, at the time the agent decides to have a co¤ee with his boss he does not know his performance on the soft signal. If
this were the case, the agent would attempt to inuence his boss only after observing vs = B so that inviting the boss for a
co¤ee would automatically reveal the soft signal (v = B) to the principal. This is why, in the timing of our model, inuence
activities (in Stage 2) precede the collection of the soft signal (vs) (in Stage 3).
13This is the case if we assume that a third party can design a mechanism that would punish the agent and the principal if
they do not reveal the same value of the soft signal vs.
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allow us to disentangle the issues related to the fact that subjective evaluations are unveriable (MacLeod,
2003) from the issues related to the manipulability of such evaluations.
Finally, we assume that the objective of the principal is to implement the high level of e¤ort (we therefore
refer to eH as the e¢ cient level of e¤ort) and study the contract that elicits the e¢ cient level of e¤ort at the
lowest possible cost to the principal.14
2.3 Denitions and Properties of Optimal Contracts
In this section, we introduce notations and denitions that will be useful to characterize optimal contracts.
We denote by w = [w1G; w1B ; w0G; w0B ], where w 2 R4+, the contract designed by the principal in
Stage 1 according to which the agent will be paid as a function of the hard and the soft signals. In the
absence of supervision, the principal does not collect a soft signal and the contract is dened as follows
wN = [w1?; w0?], where wN2 R2+: We thus denote wyvs := w (y; vs) the wage that will be received by the
agent if the hard signal is y and the soft signal perceived by the principal is vs. We denote w^ (w^N ) the
contracts that implement the e¢ cient level of e¤ort eH at the lowest possible cost to the principal in the
presence (absence) of supervision. We denote by P1[P0] the probability vector associated with receiving the
payments in w = [w1G; w1B ; w0G; w0B ] when the agent is supervised and exerts a high [low] level of e¤ort
on the productive task. The probability vector associated with the payments wN = [w1;?; w0;?] is denoted
by PN1 [P
N
0 ] when the agent exerts a high [low] level of e¤ort on the productive task.
15
A principal who su¤ers from cognitive bias in the perception of the true supervision signal ( > 0) may
decide not to supervise the agent so as to avoid manipulation attempts. However, the soft signal may include
additional information on the agent level of e¤ort that the principal may need in order to incentivate the
agent to exert a high level of e¤ort. The decision of supervising the agent or not will be determined by
comparing the informative value of the soft signal and the cost of its acquisition.
Denition 1 We say that the supervision signal is valuable to the principal as long as there exists (w^; w^N ) 2
R4+  R2+ that implement eH such that w^P1   w^NPN1 < 0.
In line with Denition 1, the soft signal is valuable to implement the e¢ cient level of e¤ort when it is
informative about the agents performance (i.e., when it contains pieces of information that can be used to
14This assumption can be sustained as long as the revenues for the principal following a high level of production R(1) are
su¢ ciently higher than the principals revenues following a low level of production R(0). In that case, the expected revenues
obtained by the principal from incentivizing the agent to work hard would always compensate for the costs of implementing
the high level of e¤ort.
15For simplicity we assume that wages are row vectors and probabilities are column vectors so as to avoid the use of transposes.
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elicit the agents level of e¤ort at a lower cost).16
Our objective is to characterize the optimal contract that implements eH in the presence of supervision 
w^ 2 R4+

as well as in the absence of supervision
 
w^N2 R2+

. To do so, we will use the following denitions
that assess the respective weights of the hard and the soft signals as well as the power of incentives. We
assess the relative weight of each signal by comparing optimal wages in the situation in which the principal
receives conicting signals ((y; vs) 2 f(1; B) ; (0; G)g). We also investigate how the di¤erence between these
wages (w1B and w0G) changes when there is an increase in a parameter  (namely, the principals bias  or
the inuence cost a).
Denition 2 (Respective weights of hard and soft signals)
i) We say that more weight is assigned to the hard (soft) signal in the optimal contract if w0G < w1B
(w0G > w1B).
ii) We say that an increase in a parameter () raises the weight that is assigned to the hard (soft) signal
in the optimal contract if @@ (w1B   w0G) > 0 ( @@ (w0G   w1B) > 0).
In the following denition we assess the responsiveness of incentive contracts to hard and soft signals.
In particular we state that the power of incentives associated with an optimal contract increases in a given
signal if the di¤erence between wages following a low value of the signal and wages following a high value
of the signal increases. In that respect our denition of the power of incentives is related to the concept of
wage compression since a reduction in the power of incentives in both hard and soft signals implies wage
compression.
Denition 3 (Wage compression and the power of incentives)
i) We say that the power of incentives increases (decreases) in the hard signal (y) with respect to parameter
() whenever @(w1vs w0vs )@ > 0 (< 0) for any vs 2 fB;G;?g.
ii) We say that the power of incentives increases (decreases) in the soft signal (vs) with respect to the
parameter () whenever @(wyG wyB)@k > 0 (< 0) for any y 2 f0; 1g.
3 Rational Supervision
Our benchmark model assumes that the principal is able to identify the soft signal without errors ( = 0).
In that context, the agent will never engage in an inuence activity (a = 0) in Stage 2 given that he will not
be able to manipulate the soft signal and distort the principals beliefs as a result.
16 In case of costless supervision (s = 0) it is easy to see that the principal will supervise the agent whenever the precision
of the soft signal satises the condition that v >
1
2
.
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We analyze how wages are set by the principal in that case and discuss the role of supervision. We denote
by w^R

w^RN

the optimal contracts that allow the principal to implement the e¢ cient level of e¤ort eH in the
absence of inuence ( = 0) and in the presence [absence] of supervision. Our rst proposition characterizes
the optimal contract w^R under supervision.
Proposition 1 (Optimal wages under supervision) If the principal supervises the agent in the model
without inuence, the optimal contract w^Rthat implements the e¢ cient equilibrium satises the following
conditions:
- If 12 < v  y then w^R0B < w^R0G  w^R1B < w^R1G
- If 12 < y < v then w^
R
0B < w^
R
1B < w^
R
0G < w^
R
1G
Our results follow from the fact that wages are non-decreasing in either the hard or the soft signal.17
That is, w^R1vs  w^R0vs for any vs 2 fB;Gg and w^RyG  w^RyB for any y 2 f0; 1g. Also, the relative weight given
to each signal depends on the relative precision of the soft and hard signals. If the soft signal is less precise
than the hard signal v  y then more weight will be assigned to the hard signal in the optimal contract
whereas more weight will be assigned to the soft signal if the reverse is true v > y. In the presence of
conicting signals ((y; vs) 2 f(1; B) ; (0; G)g) optimal wages are set according to the hard evidence so that
w^R0G  w^R1B if v  y whereas the reverse is true for v > y.
In Corollary 1A in the appendix, we show that an increase in the precision of a signal leads to an increase
(decrease) in wages whenever this signal brings good (bad) news about the level of e¤ort of the agent. This
implies that an increase in the precision of the output signal (supervision signal), raises the weight that
is assigned to the hard (soft) signal in the optimal contract. In Corollary 2A in the appendix, we derive
the relationship between wages under supervision and wages in the absence of supervision. We show that
not supervising the agent yields an optimal contract w^RN = (w^
R
0?; w^
R
1?) that satises w^
R
y? 2 (w^RyB ; w^RyG)
for y 2 f0; 1g; and v > 12 . We establish the conditions under which the principal is willing to obtain an
additional signal through supervision in Corollary 3A in the appendix. We also discuss how the decision to
supervise the agent is a¤ected by the precision of the hard and the soft signals. These preliminary results
are in line with previous research such as Holmström (1979), Lambert (1985) and Banker and Datar (1989).
Our following result establishes a relationship between the cost of supervision and the precision of the
signals. We show that an increase in the precision of the signals decreases the optimal expected wages to
be paid by the principal in Stage 3 so that the cost of implementing the e¢ cient level of e¤ort decreases.
We also analyze how the decision to supervise the agent is a¤ected by the precision of the hard and the soft
signals.
17This is the case because our signals satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property.
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Corollary 1 (E¢ ciency cost and precision of the signals)
i) As the precision of the hard or the soft signal increases the cost for the principal of achieving the
e¢ cient level of e¤ort decreases.
ii) @ w^
R
NP
N
1  w^RP1
@v
> 0.
iii) @ w^
R
NP
N
1  w^RP1
@y
< 0
The interpretation of the rst part of the corollary follows directly from the fact that both the hard and
the soft signals are valuable. The last two parts of the corollary imply that supervision is less pervasive
when the hard signal is more precise whereas the reverse is true when the soft signal is more precise.18 This
interpretation follows from the fact that (w^
R
NP
N
1  w^RP1) measures the extent to which supervision lowers
the expected cost for the principal of implementing the e¢ cient level of e¤ort. For a perfectly precise hard
signal
 
y = 1

the e¢ cient level of e¤ort can be implemented by the principal without supervising the agent
since, in that case, she has complete information on the subordinates level of e¤ort.
4 Supervision and Inuence
In this section we consider the case in which the supervisor can be inuenced by the agent ( > 0). In
that context, the principal may update the soft signal incorrectly as she su¤ers from cognitive biases in the
perception of the supervision signal. If the principal decides to supervise the agent in this setup, she has
two di¤erent options. On the one hand, the principal can propose inuence contracts (wI) for which she
anticipates that, in equilibrium, agents will be willing to manipulate the soft signal. On the other hand, the
principal can deter manipulation attempts by proposing inuence-free contracts (wF ). In this latter case,
the optimization problem of the principal includes an additional constraint to deter inuence activities.19 In
what follows, we compare both strategies for the principal and characterize the properties that are satised
by the optimal contracts that implement the e¢ cient level of e¤ort.
We solve our model by backward induction. We rst determine the condition under which the agent
undertakes the costly inuence activity (a = 1) : Then, we analyze whether the principal is willing to deter
inuence activities from the agent and design inuence-free contracts.
18This result is closely related to the classical trade-o¤ between risk and incentives in the moral hazard literature. See
Prendergast (1999) for a discussion of this trade-o¤ in the light of the empirical literature.
19One of the important questions to be addressed in practice is whether the principal, being aware of her bias, should supervise
the agent or not. We discuss this issue in Lemma 1A in the appendix, in which we specify the condition under which supervision
will take place.
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4.1 Inuence contracts
If the principal decides to supervise the agent in an e¢ cient equilibrium, she can allow for the inuence
activity by choosing an optimal contract w^I = [w^I1G; w^
I
1B ; w^
I
0G; w^
I
0B ] that satises the condition that the
agent will perform the inuence activity (a = 1).20 In that case, w^I is dened as the wage vector that
minimizes the cost of implementing the high level of e¤ort (wIPI1); where P
I
1 is the probability vector
associated with the case in which the agent exerts a high level of e¤ort on the productive task and the
principal accepts inuence from the agent.
We show in Proposition 1A in the appendix that supervision remains valuable even in the presence of
inuence activities given that soft signals continue to be informative about the agent level of e¤ort as long
as v >
1
2 and  < 1. We also characterize the optimal contract under inuence. In line with Proposition
1, our results for the case of inuence contracts indicate that optimal wages are non-decreasing in either the
hard or the soft signal. It is also found that more weight is assigned to the hard signal when its precision
(y) is higher than the precision of the soft signal (v). However, for y < v it may not be the case that
more weight is given to the soft signal since the principal being aware of her own biases (Assumption A),
takes into account the possibility that the soft signal has been manipulated. In particular, we only observe
that more weight is assigned to the soft signal if (i) its precision is su¢ ciently high
 
y < v

and (ii) the
principals bias is su¢ ciently low (  (y; v) where (y; v) := v yv+y 1 ).
21 If the latter condition is not
satised, more weight is given to the hard signal compared to the soft signal even though y < v. It occurs
because the precision of the soft signal is not high enough to compensate for the principals bias.22
4.2 Inuence-free contracts
Recall that there exists also the possibility for the principal to design inuence-free contracts (wF ) that
discourage the agent from inuencing his supervisor. We denote w^F = (w^F1B ; w^
F
1G; w^
F
0G; w^
F
0B) the optimal
20We derive the condition (IA) under which the agent who is being supervised performs the inuence activity in Lemma 1A
in the appendix. We note that for costless inuence activities (a = 0) the subset of optimal wages that satisfy the condition is
non-empty. In general, there exists an upper bound for inuence activities costs
 
a  a

for which the condition is satised.
21This threshold is determined by equating the likelihood ratios associated with the hard signal and the soft signal in the
case of inuence contracts. That is, v+(1 v)
v+(1 v) =
y
1 y .
22When we compare the optimal contracts under inuence w^I and the optimal contract with rational supervision w^R we
conclude that the latter tends to put more weight on the hard signal relative to the soft signal. Further comparisons between
these contracts are available in Corollary 4A in the appendix. This includes the proof that the e¢ ciency cost incurred by the
principal increases in the presence of inuence ( > 0) with respect to the case of rational supervision whenever the soft signal
becomes either more manipulable or more precise.
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contract such that the agent is not willing to distort the supervisors assessment on his work and denote
PF1 the probability vector associated with this contract.
23 It follows that the principal designs inuence-free
contracts to implement eH as long as the expected wages that are paid by the principal under inuence-free
contracts are lower than in the case of inuence contracts.
w^IPI1  w^FP1 (1)
If this condition is satised, the principal designs inuence-free contracts by imposing an additional
constraint in her optimization problem so as to discourage the inuence activity. In Table 1 below we
summarize the properties that are satised by the optimal contracts that implement the e¢ cient level of
e¤ort both when the principal allows for inuence (w^I) and when the principal designs inuence-free contracts
(w^F ) that deter inuence activities (see Proposition 2A in the appendix for further details).
Our results summarized in Table 1 indicate that the optimal contract that implements the e¢ cient
equilibrium w^j for j 2 fI; Fg is such that an increase in the principals bias () raises the weight which is
23By denition we know that PF1 := P1.
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assigned to the hard signal. This occurs because an increase in the principals bias reduces the likelihood
ratio associated with the soft signal, implying that conditionally on observing a positive soft signal vs = G; it
is less likely that the agent has exerted a high level of e¤ort.24 Importantly, the inuence and the inuence-
free contracts di¤er with respect to the likelihood ratio associated with a negative soft signal vs = B. This
is the case because optimal wages w^I0B and w^
I
1B are not a¤ected by the principals bias whereas w^
F
0B and
w^F1B increase in . Indeed, as  increases, the soft signal becomes more manipulable and inuence activities
become more appealing. In order to o¤set this e¤ect of an increase in , inuence-free contracts specify
larger payments upon reception of a negative soft signal so as to deter agents from engaging in inuence
activities and distorting negative soft signals.
The previous results imply that the variance of wages decreases in the bias of the principal wether
inuence or inuence-free contracts are implemented (i.e., the power of incentives decreases in the soft signal
vs with respect to the principals bias ). In our model, the principal is willing to use the hard signal more
intensively relative to the soft signal as  increases since the level of information of the soft signal decreases
in the principals bias.25 It can be shown that the manipulability of the soft signal tends to increase the cost
for the principal of implementing the e¢ cient level of e¤ort (see Proposition 3A in the appendix). That is,
as the soft signal becomes more manipulable, supervision tends to be less e¤ective as a disciplining device
for the agent because the accuracy of this signal decreases in . This implies that a larger rent will have to
be paid to the risk-averse agent in order to ensure that the participation constraint holds. As a result, the
principal would be better-o¤ in an organizational environment in which agents do not have the possibility
to inuence her assessments. For example, supervisors may limit communication with subordinates to avoid
inuence activities (Milgrom, 1988; Milgrom and Roberts, 1988). They may also design an organizational
structure that limits interpersonal relationships between employees at di¤erent levels of the hierarchy. This
can be achieved by having employees at di¤erent layers of the hierarchy work at di¤erent locations as is
the case in the increasingly popular virtual organizations. In that case, employeessupervision is performed
through computer-mediated communication systems.26 However, the quality of the supervision signal may
be undermined in those cases (Jarvenpaa and Leidner, 1999). The optimal strategy consists for the principal
of nding the right balance between getting access to information about the agents level of e¤ort while
24 Indeed, this likelihood ratio is equal to 1  1 v+v
v
.
25To see empirical evidence on the prevalence of hard information, see Liberti and Mian (2009), who highlight that higher
hierarchical distance between the decision-maker and the agent who collects the information yields less reliance on soft infor-
mation.
26A large number of programs such as Spectorsoft, Virtual MonitoringTM , Employee Monitoring or Webwatcher are already
available to monitor employeesactivities. An early account of computer-based monitoring systems was considered in Chalyko¤
and Kochan (1989).
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avoiding inuence activities.
5 Inuence Costs and the Value of the Firm
Inuence activities are costly for the organization as they detract workers from their productive task (Milgrom
and Roberts, 1992). In this section we consider the case in which the inuence activity (a 2 f0; 1g) a¤ects
the value of the rm negatively. We assume that inuence activities are time-consuming and undermine
the quality of the work of the agent. This productivity-based inuence cost translates into the following
assumption in which inuence activities reduce the probability that the agent obtains the high level of
output for a given level of e¤ort.
Assumption C (Inuence costs and the value of the rm)
If the agent decides to undertake an inuence activity (a = 1), then P [y = 1 j e = eH ] =
(1  ) y and P [y = 1 j e = eL] = (1  )
 
1  y

where  2 [0; 1] measures the inuence cost.
We assume no privately-incurred inuence costs, that is a = 0.
Assumption C states that undertaking the inuence activity is costly for the principal as it undermines
the productivity of the agent. Thus, the inuence activity decreases the likelihood for the principal of
receiving the high level of output (y = 1) and therefore reduces her expected revenues.
We start by considering the case in which the principal decides to supervise the agent in Stage 1. We
analyze the decision of the principal to supervise the agent or not in Section 5.3.
In line with the previous section, the principal will either design contracts that allow for inuence ac-
tivities in equilibrium (inuence contracts) or design contracts that deter inuence activities (inuence-free
contracts).
5.1 Inuence contracts
In the next proposition we characterize the optimal inuence contract w^ = (w^1G; w^

1B ; w^

0G; w^

0B) that
implements the e¢ cient level of e¤ort eH in the case of productivity-based inuence costs.
Proposition 2 (Inuence contracts and power of incentives)
i) The optimal inuence contract that implements the e¢ cient equilibrium satises either the condition
that an increase in the principals bias () or that a decrease in inuence costs () raises the weight that is
assigned to the hard signal in the optimal contract.
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ii) The optimal inuence contract that implements the e¢ cient equilibrium satises the condition that
the power of incentives decreases in the soft signal (vs) with respect to the principals bias () whereas the
power of incentives decreases in the hard signal with respect to inuence costs ().
As in the case of private inuence costs (see Table 1, right column), we nd that an increase in the
manipulability of the soft signal () reduces its accuracy and leads the principal to put more weight on the
hard signal. In addition, the power of incentives decreases in the soft signal with respect to the manipulability
of the signal. Consequently, the manipulability of the soft signal tends to increase the cost for the principal
of implementing the e¢ cient level of e¤ort.27
The novel part of Proposition 2 is related to the comparative statics of the productivity-based inuence
costs (). In particular, a reduction in these costs tends to lower the weight that is assigned to the hard
and non-manipulable signal (y). This is the case because the accuracy of a low level of output (y = 0) as a
predictor of the level of e¤ort of the agent decreases as  rises. Indeed, in the presence of productivity-based
inuence costs, a low level of production can be attributed either to a low level of e¤ort or to inuence
activities. This implies that a low output signal is interpreted less negatively in the presence of productivity-
based inuence costs, that is
@w^0vs
@ > 0 for any vs 2 fB;Gg.28 In the extreme case in which inuence costs
destroy the whole output ( = 1) the signal y = 0 is uninformative about the level of e¤ort of the agent.
As a result, the weight of the hard signal in the agents wage will be reduced as productivity-based inuence
costs increase. Also, applying Denition 3 we know that the power of incentives decreases in the hard signal
with respect to  since
@w^0vs
@ > 0 and
@w^1vs
@ = 0 for any vs 2 fB;Gg.
5.2 Inuence-free contracts
Recall that the principal needs not accept inuence activities from the agent and may design inuence-free
contracts that deter manipulation attempts. We denote by w^f = (w^f1G; w^
f
1B ; w^
f
0G; w^
f
0B)
h
Pf1
i
the optimal
inuence-free wage contract [probability vector] in the case of productivity-based inuence costs.29 The
principal designs inuence-free contracts instead of inuence contracts in Stage 1 as long as the following
condition is satised:
R (y) +wP1  wfP1 (2)
This condition states that it is optimal for the principal to design inuence-free contracts as long as
the cost of implementing an e¢ cient equilibrium under inuence-free contracts is lower than in the case of
27The proof is similar to the case of private inuence costs (see Proposition 3A in the appendix).
28Note that the informativeness of the hard signal y = 1 is not a¤ected by , that is
@w^1vs
@
= 0 for any vs 2 fB;Gg.
29As we pointed out in Section 4.2, we know that Pf1 := P1
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inuence contract. The cost associated with the use of inuence contracts consists of two parts: the reduction
in the revenues of the rm due to destructive inuence activities (R (y)) and the payment of wages to the
agent (wP1). It is worth noting that the term R (y) corresponds to productivity-based inuence costs that
do not enter the principals decision when inuence costs are privately incurred by the agent (see condition
(1)). We determine in the next proposition two su¢ cient conditions for the principal to choose inuence-free
contracts in the presence of productivity-based costs.
Proposition 3 (Inuence-free strategy)
i) If the inuence costs () satises the condition that   f then the principal will use inuence-free
contracts to implement the e¢ cient equilibrium.
ii) If the revenues of the high level of output R(1) satises the condition that R (1)  Rf then the principal
will use inuence-free contracts to implement the e¢ cient equilibrium.
The rst part of the proposition states that the principal is better-o¤ eliminating inuence activities by
setting inuence-free contracts when the cost of inuence activities for the rm is large (  f ). In the
extreme case in which  = 1 the presence of inuence activities will bring the revenues of the principal
down to R(0) meaning that inuence-free contracts cannot be dominated by inuence contracts. This is the
case because inuence contracts would generate the minimum possible expected revenues for the principal.
Indeed, in the worst scenario the principal can always eliminate inuence activities by setting wages that
are not contingent on the soft signal (w^fyB = w^
f
yG for y 2 f0; 1g) in which case the agent may still have
incentives to exert a high level of e¤ort if the hard signal is su¢ ciently informative.
The second part of the proposition relies on the fact that the cost for the rm associated with inuence
activities increases in R (y). Indeed, the more productive the agent is, the more detrimental inuence
activities are to the value of the rm. As a result, the principal will design inuence-free contracts whenever
the high level of output produced by the agent is su¢ ciently valuable to the principal, that is for R (1)  Rf .
In the following proposition we characterize the main properties of the optimal inuence-free contract
w^f . We denote  = max f0; 1;fg where 0 = (1 y)(1 )y and 1 =
(1 v)
(1 )v+ .
Proposition 4 (Inuence-free contracts and power of incentives) i) The optimal inuence-free con-
tract that implements the e¢ cient level of e¤ort satises the condition that either an increase in the principals
bias () or an increase in productivity-based inuence costs () raises the weight that is assigned to the hard
signal.
ii) The optimal inuence-free contract that implements the e¢ cient level of e¤ort satises the condition
that the power of incentives decreases in the soft signal (vs) with respect to the principals bias (). In
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addition, for any   , the power of incentives increases in the hard signal with respect to inuence costs
(). As a result, the variance of wages increases in productivity-based inuence costs ().
Similarly to the case of inuence contracts, inuence-free contracts are such that the weight assigned to
soft manipulable signals increase as the manipulability of the signal increases (). This nding holds for
inuence and inuence-free contracts whether we consider productivity-based or privately-incurred inuence
costs (see Table 1). Nonetheless, in the presence of productivity-based inuence costs, inuence and inuence-
free contracts di¤er since an increase in inuence costs () raises the weight that is assigned to the hard
signal in the case of inuence-free contract (Proposition 4i)) while the opposite is true in the case of inuence
contracts (Proposition 2i)).
The intuition for this result follows from the fact that principals can use one of the following two mech-
anisms in order to design inuence-free contracts and deter inuence activities. The rst approach is to
set up incentive contracts that are less responsive to the soft signal so as to reduce the expected benets
associated with inuence activities. This rst approach would induce even greater wage compression and
weaker incentives in the case of productivity-based inuence costs than in the case of private inuence costs.
This is the case because the cost of initiating inuence activities is lower when it is not privately incurred
by the agent making the manipulation of soft signals potentially more appealing to him. As a result, de-
terring inuence activities in the presence of productivity-based inuence costs will require a high level of
wage compression and low-powered incentives. An alternative approach, which is actually followed by the
principal in equilibrium, consists of increasing the opportunity cost of inuence activities by increasing the
incentives associated with the hard signal. In that case, inuence activities become less protable as they
reduce the probability that the agent will get the high payment associated with a high level of performance
on the hard signal. Consequently, the principal will increase the weight given to the hard signal so as to
discourage inuence activities (see Proposition 2i).
The second part of Proposition 2 follows from the fact that for any    the following comparative
statics hold @w^
f
1G
@ > 0,
@w^f1B
@ > 0,
@w^f0G
@ < 0 and
@w^f0B
@ < 0. Applying Denition 3, we conclude that, for any
  , the power of incentives increases in the hard signal with respect to . Notice that the threshold ()
above which inuence costs lead to an increase in the power of incentives increases in the principals bias
(). This occurs because for high values of  we obtain that @w^
f
1G
@  0 in which case the power of incentives
does not increase in the hard signal with regard to inuence costs. For large values of  the principals mind
is more manipulable and inuence activities are more appealing to agents. As a result, eliminating inuence
activities may require decreasing the pay associated with the highly manipulable soft signal (
@w^fyG
@ < 0 for
any y 2 f0; 1g) in addition to increasing the pay associated with a high level of output (@w^
f
1vs
@ > 0 for any
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vs 2 fB;Gg). If the former e¤ect dominates the latter then @w^
f
1G
@  0.
The main implication of Proposition 4 is that inuence-free contracts may signicantly di¤er from in-
uence contracts with regard to the weight given to hard and soft signals. This nding suggests that in
the presence of productivity-based inuence costs workers with di¤erent levels of productivity may be o¤ered
di¤erent types of contracts. We elaborate on this conjecture in the next corollary by showing that high-
powered incentives and inuence-free contracts are more likely to be o¤ered to agents for which inuence is
especially costly in terms of rm productivity.30
Corollary 2 (Inuence-free contract and agents productivity) If the productivity-based inuence costs
 satises the condition that   , then there exists a level of productivity R () above which wages of-
fered to low-productivity agents
 
R (1) < R ()

are less responsive to the hard signal than they are for
high-productivity agents
 
R (1)  R ().
This corollary follows from Proposition 3 according to which high-productivity workers (R (1)  Rf ) will
be o¤ered inuence-free contracts whereas low-productivity agents (R (1) < Rf ) will be o¤ered contracts
under which it is optimal for the agents to inuence the principals perception of the soft signal. This result is
in line with the main ndings in Green (1998) that studies the impact of skills on wages. Green (1998) nds
that computer skills (i.e., hard signals) are highly valued whereas communication skills (i.e., soft signals)
have little impact on wages, so that workers at higher levels of the hierarchy receive wages that are more
responsive to the hard signal than to the soft signal.
More generally, our ndings suggest that top executives, in particular CEOs, are more likely to be paid
according to hard signals than employees at lower levels of the hierarchy. For example, our results are
consistent with the widespread use of stock options in top executivescompensation packages in addition to
bonus pay (see Tirole, 2006 pp.21-25 for a review). Indeed, bonus plans are typically based on accounting
data that can be manipulated by top executives while stock options incentives are less likely to be a¤ected by
such manipulation attempts. As a result, the use of stock options in top executivescompensation packages
can be motivated by the willingness to limit the inuence activities that are inherent to bonus incentives
plans. Inuence activities may then account for the widespread use of stock options despite the loose link
that exists between top executiveslevels of e¤ort and stock prices.
30 R () denotes the level of productivity such that the principal is indi¤erent between supervising the agent or not for a given
level of inuence costs .
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5.3 Supervision
In this section, we analyze whether it is optimal for the principal to supervise the agent and gather a
manipulable signal in a context of productivity-based inuence costs. In the following corollary we show that,
even in the absence of supervision costs (s = 0), the principal may decide to avoid supervision and rely
solely on the hard signal when the inuence activity entails a cost for the organization.
Corollary 3 (Supervision and inuence) If the principals bias  satises that     then the princi-
pal will not be willing to supervise the agent, even though supervision is costless.
The intuition behind this result follows from the fact that supervision generates an indirect cost by permit-
ting the emergence of inuence activities that are detrimental to the rm. This implies that technologically
costless supervision can actually destroy rm value. This result holds for     because discouraging inu-
ence activities is very costly for large values of . Indeed, if the soft signal is highly manipulable the principal
will have to dissuade inuence activities by putting a particularly important weight on the hard signal that
may increase the variance of wages and the cost of implementing the e¢ cient level of e¤ort as a result. For
example, in the extreme case in which  = 1 and  = 0 the principal will be indi¤erent between supervising
and not supervising the agent since then w^P 1 = w^
R
NP
N
1 . However, if we take  = 1 and  = " where
" > 0 and " is arbitrarily close to zero, the principal will not be willing to supervise the agent so as to avoid
inuence activities that undermine the productivity of the agents. In that case, "R (1) + w^P 1  w^RNPN1 so
that the principal will save costs of implementing the e¢ cient level of e¤ort by focusing on the hard signal
and not supervising the agent.31
Interestingly, this result di¤ers from the case of private inuence costs in which supervision was always
valuable for the principal as long as v >
1
2 and  < 1. This di¤erence follows from the fact that under
productivity-based inuence costs the principal faces a trade-o¤ between gathering an informative soft signal
and incurring inuence costs associated with the supervision activity. Our result o¤ers an alternative ex-
planation to the fact that supervision activities may lower e¤ort and motivation of employees (Frey, 1993,
Falk and Kosfeld, 2006). The previous authors stress that agents tend to lower their level of e¤ort as a
response to the signal of distrust created by the principals decision to supervise their subordinate. In our
setting, supervision undermines the provision of e¤ort because it gives the agent the opportunity to engage
in destructive inuence activities.
31A similar reasoning can be applied to the case in which inuence-free contracts are used, that is   f . In that context,
the cost of implementing the e¢ cient level of e¤ort follows from the fact that the principal will have to dissuade inuence
activities by putting an excessive weight on the hard signal that may increase the variance of wages and increase the cost of
implementing the e¢ cient equilibrium compared with the case without supervision.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the design of incentive contracts in a principal-agent model in which the agent had
the possibility to manipulate pieces of information about his actual performance by undertaking inuence
activities. We considered successively the cases in which inuence activities entailed a private cost to the
agent and the case in which those activities diverted the agent from producing for the principal.
In both contexts, we found that an increase in the manipulability (i.e., softness) of the signal increases
information asymmetry between the agent and the principal and increases the cost of implementing the
e¢ cient level of e¤ort as a result. Also, we showed that an increase in the manipulability of the soft signal
raises the weight assigned to the non-manipulable hard signal and decreases the power of incentives associated
with the soft signal whether the principal designs inuence or inuence-free contracts.
In the case of productivity-based inuence costs we identied fundamental di¤erences between inuence
and inuence-free contracts regarding the e¤ect of an increase in inuence costs. In particular, the weight
assigned to the hard signal decreases in the inuence costs in the case of inuence contracts while the
opposite is true in the case of inuence-free contracts. This result holds because in the case of productivity-
based inuence costs, it is optimal for the principal to deter inuence activities by increasing their opportunity
cost. This is achieved by raising the incentives associated with the hard signal. More specically, we show
that high-powered incentives and inuence-free contracts are more likely to be assigned to agents for which
inuence is especially costly in terms of rm productivity. This result is in line with empirical ndings in
Green (1998) showing that workers at higher levels of the hierarchy receive wages that are more responsive to
the computer-based hard signal than to the communication-based soft signal (see also Liberti and Mian 2009).
In addition, our ndings suggest that the widespread use of stock options in top executivescompensation
packages may be attributed to the low manipulability of stock prices compared with accounting data on the
basis of which bonus incentives are calculated.
Finally, we showed that in the presence of productivity-based inuence costs the principal may intentionally
avoid supervising the agent when the manipulability of the soft signal is high. This result holds even if
supervision is costless since the principal faces a trade-o¤ between gathering an informative soft signal and
incurring inuence costs associated with the supervision activity.
Although our model provides a generalization of the principal-agent model for the case in which some
signals are manipulable, we deliberately abstract away from the interesting case of multi-agents frameworks.
However, in their denition of inuence activities, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) envisage not only personal
attempts to manipulate the principals view of oneself but also the time devoted by organizational members
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to countervail the manipulation attempts of their coworkers. In order to apprehend inuence activities at
the organizational level, extending our analysis to the case of multi-agent models with team production and
hierarchies may be a fruitful area for future research.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
We denote w = [w1G; w1B ; w0G; w0B ] the contingent contract o¤ered by the principal in the case of
supervision. We denote P1 [P0] the probability of receiving each of these payments when exerting a high
[low] level of e¤ort, that is:
P1 := (pi1)i2f1;:::;4g =
26666664
yv
y (1  v) 
1  y

v 
1  y

(1  v)
37777775
And P0 := (pi0)i2f1;:::;4g =
26666664
 
1  y

(1  v) 
1  y

v
y (1  v)
yv
37777775.
The optimal contract that implements the e¢ cient equilibrium in the case of rational supervision solves
the following problem:8>>><>>>:
(1) w^R = min
w2R4
wP1
(2) u (w)P1   e  u IR
(3) u (w)P1   e  u (w)>P0 IC
where u(w)=[u(w1G); u(w1B); u(w0G); u(w0B)] : In order to ensure that the optimization program is con-
cave we will write the optimization program as a function of h = u 1 the inverse function of u(), which is
increasing and convex, that is h0 > 0 and h00 > 0.32 We then dene u1G = u(w1G); u1B = u(w1B); u0G =
u(w0G) and u0B = u(w0B) so that w1G = h(u1G), w1;B = h(u1B); w0G = h(u0G) and w0B = h(u0B):
Thereby, the Principal solves:8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(1) w^R = min
f(u0v;u1v)g
p11h(u1G) + p21h(u1B) + p31h(u0G) + p41h(u0B)
(2) p11u1G + p21u1B + p31u0G + p41u0B   e  u IR
(3) (p11   p10)u1G + (p21   p20)u1B + (p31   p30)u0G IC
+(p14   p04)u0B   e  0
We denote   0 and   0 the Lagrange multipliers associated with the incentive constraint and the
individual rationality constraint. We then get the following rst order conditions.
32We use this change of variable h = u 1 following Jean-Jaques La¤ont and David Martimort (2002).
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8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(10B) h
0(u1G) =
p11+(p11 p10)
p11
(10G) h
0(u1B) =
p21+(p21 p20)
p21
(11B) h
0(u0G) =
p31+(p31 p30)
p31
(11G) h
0(u0B) =
p41+(p41 p40)
p41
Since h
0
(x) = 1=u0(x) we can write:8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
(11G) u
0  w^R1G = yvyv+(y+v 1)
(11B) u
0  w^R1B = (1 v)y(1 v)y+(y v)
(10G) u
0  w^R0G = (1 y)v(1 y)v+(v y)
(10B) u
0  w^R0B = (1 y)(1 v)(1 y)(1 v)+(1 y v)
In addition, we get the feasibility and Slackness conditions:
(2IR) u
 
w^R

P1   e   u  0
(3IC) u
 
w^R

(P1  P0)  e  0
(4) [u
 
w^R

P1   e   u] = 0
(5) [u
 
w^R

(P1  P0)  e)] = 0
CASE 1. It should be clear that  =  = 0 is not a solution for the problem above because it would
imply u0(w^) =1.
CASE 2. If  > 0 and  = 0 then,n
(10B) u
0  w^R0B = (1 y)(1 v)(1 y v) > 0 i¤ y + v < 1
But y + v < 1 contradicts y; v 2 [ 12 ; 1]
CASE 3. If  = 0 and  > 0 then,
u0
 
w^R0B

= u0
 
w^R0G

= u0
 
w^R1B

= u0
 
w^R1G

= 1 > 0
In this case, the Principals optimal choice is to propose a xed wage contract but the agent will not
perform high e¤ort because (3IC) does not hold.
CASE 4. Therefore for the solution to exist,  > 0 and  > 0 so (IC) and (IR) are binding constraints.33
Thus,8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(10B) u
0  w^R0B = (1 y)(1 v)(1 y)(1 v)+(1 y v)
(10G) u
0  w^R0G = (1 y)v(1 y)v+(v y)
(11B) u
0  w^R1B = (1 v)y(1 v)y+(y v)
(11G) u
0  w^R1G = yvyv+(y+v 1) > 0
(2IR) u
 
w^R

P1   e   u = 0
(3IC) u
 
w^R

(P1  P0)  e = 0
33MacLeod (2003) and Holmström (1979) nd exactly the same result. Hereafter, we focus on the case of  > 0 and  > 0.
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In order to ensure that u0() > 0 we would need the denominator being positive. For this to be satised,
we need to know the relationship between the precision of the signals. For instance, when y > v we would
need  < max
n
v
(y v) ;
1 v
(y+v 1)
o
= v(y v) so that u
0  w^R0B and u0  w^R0G are both positive.
Besides,8>>><>>>:
u0
 
w^R0G
  u0  w^R1B for y  v , w^R0G  w^R1B for y  v
Then, for y  v: u0
 
w^R1G

< u0
 
w^R1B
  u0  w^R0G < u0  w^R0B
, w^R0B < w^R0G  w^R1B < w^R1G
Proof of Corollary 1A. If we use the Implicit Function Theorem in equations (10B), (10G) ; (11B) and
(11G) above, we get that:8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
@w^R0B
@v
=   y(y 1)
u00(w^R0B)((y 1)(v 1)+(1 y v))2
< 0
@w^R0G
@v
=
y(y 1)
u00(w^R0G)((y 1)v+(y v))2
> 0
@w^R1B
@v
=   y(y 1)
u00(w^R1B)((v 1)y+(v y))2
< 0
@w^R1G
@v
=
y(y 1)
u00(w^R1G)(yv+(y+v 1))2
> 0
Similarly,8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
@w^R0B
@y
=   v(v 1)
u00(wR0B)((y 1)(v 1)+(1 y v))2
< 0
@w^R0G
@y
= v(v 1)
u00(wR0G)((y 1)v+(y v))2
< 0
@w^R1B
@y
= v(v 1)
u00(wR1B)((v 1)y+(v y))2
> 0
@w^R1G
@y
= v(v 1)
u00(wR1G)(yv+(y+v 1))2
> 0
Therefore,n
@w^R0B
@v
< 0;
@w^R0G
@v
> 0;
@w^R1B
@v
< 0;
@w^R1G
@v
> 0n
@w^R0B
@y
< 0;
@w^R1B
@y
< 0;
@w^R1G
@y
> 0;
@w^R0G
@y
> 0
So that an increase in the precision of the output signal (supervision signal), raises the weight that is
assigned to the hard (soft) signal in the optimal contract when supervision takes place.
Proof of Corollary 2A. When the Principal does not supervise (v = ), this can be interpreted as a
special case of the derivations above where v =
1
2 . In that case, the contingent contract o¤ered by the
principal
 
wR

to the agent is dened by two contingent payments that are respectively denoted: wR1? and
wR0?. Another way to consider the case v = f?g is to repeat the analysis in Proposition 1 with v = 12 .
In both cases, we obtain the following optimal contract.
(1L) u
0  w^R0G = u0  w^R0B = 12 (1 y)1
2(1 y)+( 12 y)
= u0
 
w^R0?

(1H) u
0  w^R1G = u0  w^R1B = 12y1
2y+(y  12 )
= u0
 
w^R1?

, w^R0? < w^R1?
Given these results, it is easy to see that:
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- If 12 < v  y then w^R0B < w^R0? < w^R0G < w^R1B < w^R1? < w^R1G
- If 12 < y < v then w^
R
0B < w^
R
0? < w^
R
1B < w^
R
0G < w^
R
1? < w^
R
1G
- If v =
1
2 then w^
R
0B = w^
R
0? = w^
R
0G and w^
R
1B = w^
R
1? = w^
R
1G
Proof of Corollary 3A. We establish the conditions under which the principal is willing to obtain a
additional signal through supervision. The principal will supervise the agent as long as the cost of supervision
s is lower than the benets obtained from supervision. Formally, the principal will decide to supervise the
agent in an e¢ cient equilibrium whenever the following condition holds.
(w^RN )P
N
1  (w^R)P1  s
where (w^RN )P
N
1  (w^R)P1 > 0 for any v 2 ( 12 ; 1]: The benets of supervision follow from the fact that
the principal can implement the e¢ cient level of e¤ort with lower wages. Indeed, under supervision the
principal has more information available to detect possible shirking behaviors of her subordinate. In fact, in
the absence of inuence activities, the supervision signal can be said to be valuable for any v >
1
2 : In that
case, the principal will be able to punish the agent severely without reducing his expected utility by keeping
constant the variance of wages.
Proof of Corollary 1. i) As v or y increases the cost of implementing the e¢ cient level of e¤ort
decreases. This can be shown using the Blackwell e¢ ciency theorem. We consider the case of y (the case
of v is symmetric).
We take the following information structure (P1;P0) that corresponds to the supervision case with P1
[P0] the probability of receiving each of these payments when exerting a high [low] level of e¤ort, that is:
P1 =
26666664
yv
y (1  v) 
1  y

v 
1  y

(1  v)
37777775 and P0 =
26666664
 
1  y

(1  v) 
1  y

v
y (1  v)
yv
37777775
Also, we consider the following information structure where the precision of the soft signal is decreased
to y   ", where " > 0.
P1" =
26666664
 
y   "

v 
y   "

(1  v) 
1  y + "

v 
1  y + "

(1  v)
37777775 and P0" =
26666664
 
1  y + "

(1  v) 
1  y + "

v 
y   "

(1  v) 
y   "

v
37777775
If we are able to show that the information structure (P1;P0) is su¢ cient, in the sense of Blackwell, for
the information structure (P1";P0") for " > 0 then we can conclude using the Blackwell su¢ ciency theorem
that the cost of implementing the e¢ cient level of e¤ort decreases in y.
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To show that (P1;P0) is su¢ cient, in the sense of Blackwell, for (P1";P0") we have to show that there
exists a transition matrix Q = (qij); (i; j) 2 f1; :::; 4g2 that is independent of the level of e¤ort such that
pj1" =
4X
j=1
qijpj1 and pj0" =
4X
j=1
qijpj0.
This can be shown taking the following transition matrix:
Q =
26666664
1  "2y 1
0
"
2y 1
0
0
1  "2y 1
0
"
2y 1
"
2y 1
0
1  "2y 1
0
0
"
2y 1
0
1  "2y 1
37777775
ii) The rest of the Corollary is derived from the previous results, taking into account that the benchmark
model corresponds to the case in which v =
1
2 . Indeed only for v =
1
2 we have that w^
R
0B = w^
R
0? = w^
R
0G and
w^R1B = w^
R
1? = w^
R
1G (see Corollary 2A). This implies that cost of implementing the e¢ cient level of e¤ort for
any v 6= 12 is strictly lower than in the benchmark model.
Proof of Lemma 1A. The soft signal should be included in the optimal contract whenever the cost of
supervision s is smaller than the benets obtained from supervising the agent. These benets correspond
to the reduction in the expected wages that the principal has to pay to incentivate the agent to exert a high
level of e¤ort. We denote wI =

wI1;G; w
I
1;B ; w
I
0;G; w
I
0;B

the vector of contingent wages under inuence and
PI1 the probability of receiving each of these payments when the agent undertakes the inuence activity,
where
PI1 :=
 
p1i1

i2f1;:::;4g =
26666664
y[v + (1  v)]
y(1  ) (1  v) 
1  y

[v + (1  v)] 
1  y

(1  ) (1  v)
37777775
We rst establish the general condition under which it is optimal for the principal to supervise her
subordinate in the case of inuence:
(w^RN )P
N
1  (w^I)P
I
1  s
If the condition above holds, contingent wages will depend on both signals. Consider the case of an
e¢ cient equilibrium (e^ = eH) : In that context, if the principal allows for inuence, the agent can undertake
the inuence activity and receive the wages in wI =

wI1;G; w
I
1;B ; w
I
0;G; w
I
0;B

with probability PI1: If the
agent does not undertake the inuence activity, then the probability of receiving these wages is given by:
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P1 = (pi1)i2f1;:::;4g =
26666664
yv
y (1  v) 
1  y

v 
1  y

(1  v)
37777775
Therefore, the agent undertakes the inuence activity if and only if
u
 
wI
>
(PI1  P1) > a.
That is,
(IA) y

u
 
wI1G
  u  wI1B] + (1  y)[u  wI0G  u  wI0B > a(1 v)
This condition states that the agent will undertake the inuence activity as long as the benets derived
from increasing the probability of receiving a high pay wyG instead of getting a low pay wyB (where wyB <
wyG for any y 2 f0; 1g) are larger than the cost of the inuence activity (a). We can see in condition (IA)
that as the quality of the hard signal
 
y

rises, the incentives for the agent to undertake the inuence activity
decrease. This occurs because as y increases, the distortion of the soft signal which is achieved through
inuence activities becomes less e¤ective. For example, the soft signal will be ignored by the principal if
the hard signal is perfectly accurate (y = 1). Finally, notice that an increase in the principals bias ()
facilitates inuence activities as it lowers the right-hand side in condition (IA). The intuitive reasoning is
that an increase in  raises the manipulability of the soft signal so that the probability with which inuence
activities turn a low pay (wyB) into a high pay (wyG) increases as well.
Proof of Proposition 1A. If the Principal supervises under inuence: vs 2 fB;Gg = v with probability
(1   ) and vS = G otherwise. Recall that the optimal contract cannot depend on the inuence activity
a 2 f0; 1g because it is unveriable. We denote the optimal contingent contract under inuence w^I =
w^I1;G; w^
I
1;B ; w^
I
0;G; w^
I
0;B
>
and denote P I1

PI0

the probability of receiving each of these payments when
exerting a high [low] level of e¤ort. Thus,
PI1 :=
 
pIi1

i2f1;:::;4g =
26666664
y[v + (1  v)]
y(1  ) (1  v) 
1  y

[v + (1  v)] 
1  y

(1  ) (1  v)
37777775
and PI0 :=
 
pIi0

i2f1;:::;4g =
26666664
 
1  y

(1  v + v) 
1  y

v(1  )
y (1  v + v)
yv(1  )
37777775.
The rst part of the proposition is to show that the signal vs is informative about the agents level of
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e¤ort whenever v >
1
2 and  < 1. Recall that P [vs = G j e = eL] = 1  v +v and P [vs = G j e = eH ] =
v +(1  v). Since, P [vs = G j e = eL] < P [vs = G j e = eH ] for any v > 12 ;  < 1 the result follows (see
La¤ont and Martimort 2002, Section 4.6.1, p168).
We can then derive the optimal contract under inuence (w^I) which solves:8>>><>>>:
(1) w^I = min
w2R4
wPI1
(2) u (w)PI1   e  u IR
(3) u (w)PI1   e  u (w)PI0 IC
We can dene u1G = u(wI1G); u1B = u(w
I
1B); u0G = u(w
I
0;G) and u0B = u(w
I
0;B) so that w
I
1G = h(u1G),
wI1B = h(u1B); w
I
0G = h(u0G) and w
I
0B = h(u0B):
Then, the rst-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and su¢ cient to determine the optimal con-
tract8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(1) w^I = min
f(u0;u1)g
pI11h(u1G) + p
I
21h(u1B) + p
I
31h(u0G) + p
I
41h(u0B)
(2) pI11u1G + p
I
21u1G + p
I
31u1G + p
I
41u1G   e  u IR
(3) pI11u1G + p
I
21u1G + p
I
31u1G + p
I
41u1G   e 
pI10u1G + p
I
20u1G + p
I
30u1G + p
I
40u1G IC
We denote  and  the non-negative Lagrange multipliers associated respectively with the incentive
compatibility (IC) constraint and the individual rationality (IR) constraint. If we use the arguments in
Proposition 1, we conclude that:8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
(11G) u
0  w^I1G = y(v+(1 v))y(v+(1 v))+(v+y 1+(y v))
(11B) u
0  w^I1B = y(1 )(1 v)y(1 )(1 v)+( 1)(v y)
(10G) u
0  w^I0G = (1 y)[v+(1 v)](1 y)[v+(1 v)]+(v y (v+y 1))
(10B) u
0  w^I0B = (1 y)(1 )(1 v)(1 y)(1 )(1 v)+( 1)(v+y 1)
And notice that lim!0 (w^I   wR) = ~0. Indeed, for  = 0 the optimal contingent contract w^I =
w^I1G; w^
I
1B ; w^
I
0G; w^
I
0B

coincides with the optimal scheme under rational supervision w^R = [w^R1G; w^
R
1B ; w^
R
0G; w^
R
0B ]:
For completeness, we can also observe that lim!1 w^I1;G   w^I1;B = 0:
If we compare (11G), (11B); (10G) and (10B) above, we get that for any v >
1
2 ; y 2 ( 12 ; 1) and  < 1 :
(1) u0
 
w^I1G

< u0
 
w^I1B

< u0
 
w^I0B
, w^I1G > w^I1B > w^I0B :
(2) u0
 
w^I1G

< u0
 
w^I0G

< u0
 
w^I0B
, w^I1G > w^I0G > w^I0B
To derive the results in Section 4.1, we need to study whether more weight is assigned to the hard or
the soft signal in the optimal contingent contract under inuence. This relationship between w^I0G and w^
I
1B
varies according to the principals bias () and the precision of the signals (v and y) and can be derived
after equating the likelihood ration associated with the hard and to the soft signal in the case of inuence.
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Then, we can see that for any  <  :=
v y
v+y 1 we have (; v; y; 0; 0) := u
0  w^I1B   u0  w^I0G > 0
therefore w^I1B < w^
I
0G: The opposite is true when   :
To sum up, if the principal supervises the agent in an e¢ cient equilibrium under inuence then (w^I)PI1 
wNP
N
1  0, where (w^I)PI1  wNPN1 = 0 for v = 12 or for  = 1. The optimal wage scheme w^I satises the
following conditions:
(a) If 12 < v  y then w^I0B < w^I0G  w^I1B < w^I1G
(b) If 12 < y < v then:
i) w^I0B < w^
I
1B  w^I0G < w^I1G for   (y; v) :=
v y
v+y 1
ii) w^I0B < w^
I
0G < w^
I
1B < w^
I
1G for  > (y; v)
Proof of Corollary 4A. In this corollary we introduce some comparative statics and compare the optimal
inuence contract in the case of cognitive bias w^I and the optimal contract in the case of rational supervision,
w^R: More precisely, we show that:
i) @ (
w^I)PI1 (w^R)
>
P1
@ > 0
ii) @ (
w^I)PI1 (w^R)
>
P1
@v
> 0
iii) @ (
w^I)PI1 (w^R)
>
P1
@y
< 0
The rst part i) follows from our Proposition 3A below.
For the second part of the corollary ii & iii) we show that @ (w^
I)>PI1 (wR)>P1
@y
< 0 (the case for v follows
the same reasoning).
We use the result established by Kim (1995), showing that an information structure P is more e¢ cient
than an information structure  if its likelihood ratio is a mean preserving spread of that of . We compute
the following function:

 
pv; 

v ; 
p
y; 

y ; 

:=
X
i2S
( i0i1  
pi0
pi1
)
Where ji stands for the precision of signal i 2 fv; yg of information structure j 2 fP;g and  := PI
denotes the probability vector under inuence.

 
v; v; y; y; 

=

(1 y)(1 v+v)
y[v+(1 v)] +
y(1 v+v)
(1 y)[v+(1 v)]

 

(1 y)(1 v)
yv
+
y(1 v)
(1 y)v

> 0
Since
@(v;v;y;y;)
@y
> 0 for any  > 0 and
@2(v;v;y;y;)
@y@
> 0.
As a result, for any y we need for the information structure 
 
; y

to be as e¢ cient as P
 
v; 
p
y

that
py = 
 
y where 
 
y < y so that 
 
v; v; 
=
y ; y; 

= 0. Also, for an increase in y to 
+
y we know that 
rises so that 
 
; +y

will be as e¢ cient as P
 
v; 
p
y

for py = y= where 
+
y  y= >  y  y. We conclude
that for an increase in y information systems  and P are not a¤ected similarly. In particular, an increase
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in y tends to favor information system P compared to  since
@2(v;v;y;y;)
@y@
> 0 that is the likelihood
ratio of information system P is increased by a larger amount than the likelihood ratio of information system
 when y rises.
These results indicate that an increase in the manipulability of the supervision signal reduces its infor-
mativeness implying that the cost of implementing the e¢ cient equilibrium increases with the bias of the
principal in the case of inuence activities compared to the case of rational supervision. Also, an increase in
the precision of the soft signal decreases the cost of implementing the e¢ cient equilibrium more signicantly
in the case of rational supervision than in the case of inuence. This is the case, since under inuence an
increase in the precision of the supervision signal is partially o¤set by the fact that it can be distorted by
the subordinate. Finally, in the presence of inuence activities an increase in the precision of the hard signal
tends to compensate for the low accuracy of the soft signal. In the extreme case in which the hard signal is
perfectly informative
 
y = 1

the principal can infer the level of e¤ort of the agent whether the soft signal
is manipulable or not.
Proof of Proposition 2A. In this proposition, we aim at characterizing the optimal contracts introduced
in Table 1. First, we investigate the properties that are satised by the optimal inuence contract w^I =
w^I1G; w^
I
1B ; w^
I
0G; w^
I
0B

: If we use the Implicit function theorem in equations (11G) ; (11B) ; (10G) and (10B) in
Proposition 1A it is easy to see that8><>:
@w^I1G
@ =
 (2v 1)(y 1)y
u00(w^I1G)(((v 1) v)y+(v+y+(y v))2
< 0
@w^I0G
@ =
 (2v 1)(y 1)y
u00(w^I0B)(((v 1) v)(1 y) (y v+(y+v 1))2
< 0
whereasn
@w^I1B
@ =
@w^I0B
@ = 0
Using these equations, we can also derive the relationship between the wages and the signalsprecision.8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
@w^I0B
@v
=   (1 
2)(y 1)y
u00(w^I0B)(((v 1) v)(1 y) (y v+(y+v 1))2
> 0
@w^I0G
@v
=   (y 1)y
u00(w^I0G)((1 y)[v+(1 v)]+(v y (v+y 1)))2
< 0
@w^I1B
@v
=   (1 
2)(y 1)y
u00(w^I1B)(y(1 )(1 v)+( 1)(v y))2
> 0
@w^I1G
@v
=   (y 1)y
u00(w^I1G)(((v 1) v)y+(v+y+(y v))2
< 0
And8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
@w^I0B
@y
= ((v 1) v)(1+( 1)v)
u00(w^I0B)(((v 1) v)(1 y) (y v+(y+v 1))2
> 0
@w^I0G
@y
= (v 1)v
u00(w^I0G)((1 y)[v+(1 v)]+(v y (v+y 1)))2
> 0
@w^I1B
@y
=   ((v 1) v)(1+( 1)v)
u00(w^I1B)(y(1 )(1 v)+( 1)(v y))2
< 0
@w^I1G
@y
=   (v 1)v
u00(w^I1G)(((v 1) v)y+(v+y+(y v))2
< 0
As a result, we conclude that the optimal inuence contract that implements the e¢ cient equilibrium
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satises the condition that an increase in the principals bias () raises the weight that is assigned to the
hard signal and that the power of incentives decreases in the soft signal (vs) with respect to the principals
bias ().
There exists the possibility for the principal to deter manipulation attempts in the case of cognitive bias.
The optimal contract to detract workers from the inuence activity (w^F ) in that context solves:8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(1) w^F = min
wi2R4
(wF )P1
(2) u
 
wF

P1   e  u IR
(3) u
 
wF

P1   e  u
 
wF

P0 IC
(4) u
 
wF

P1  u
 
wF

P1   a IF
The non-negative Lagrange multipliers are denoted  > 0,  > 0 and  > 0. We know that all of them
are positive because wR is not a solution to the optimization problem. We consider the change of variable
u1G = u(w
F
1G); u1B = u(w
F
1B); u0G = u(w
F
0G) and u0B = u(w
F
0B) to ensure concavity. We then solve for w^
F
and get:8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
(11G)u
0  w^F1G = yvyv+(y+v 1)+((v 1)y)
(11B)u
0  w^F1B = (1 v)y(1 v)y+(y v)+y(1 v)
(10G) u
0  w^F0G = (1 y)v(1 y)v+(v y)+(y+v 1 yv)
(10B)u
0  w^F0B = (1 y)(1 v)(1 y)(1 v)+(1 y v)+(v 1)(y 1)
Therefore, we can show that:
(11G)
@w^F1G
@ =  
(v 1)v2y
u00(w^F1G)((v 1)y+vy+(y+v 1))2
< 0
(11B)
@w^F1B
@ =  
(v 1)22y
u00(w^F1B)((+)(v 1)y+(v y))2
> 0
(10G)
@w^F0G
@ =  
(v 1)v(1 y)2
u00(w^F0G)((y 1)((v 1)+v)+(y v))2
< 0
(10B)
@w^F0B
@ =  
(v 1)2(y 1)2
u00(w^F0B)((+)(v 1)(y 1) (v+y 1))2
> 0
Similarly, we can derive the results for @w^
F
@y
and @w^
F
@v
by using the implicit function theorem. The main
results are reported in Table 1.
Proof of Proposition 3A. We use the result established by Kim (1995), showing that an information
structure P is more e¢ cient than an information structure  if its likelihood ratio is a mean preserving
spread of that of .
We compute the following function:

 
pv; 

v ; 
p
y; 

y ; 

:=
X
i2S
(
pIi0
pIi 1
  pi0pi1 )
Where ji stands for the precision of signal i 2 fv; yg of information structure j 2 fP;g and  := PI
denotes the probability vector under inuence.
37

 
v; v; y; y; 

=

(1 y)(1 v+v)
y[v+(1 v)] +
y(1 v+v)
(1 y)[v+(1 v)]

 

(1 y)(1 v)
yv
+
y(1 v)
(1 y)v

> 0
Since
@

(1 y)(1 v+v)
y [v+(1 v)] +
y(1 v+v)
(1 y)[v+(1 v)]

@ > 0. At the same time, we have that
@

(1 y)(1 v)
yv
+
y(1 v)
(1 y)v

@v
<
0. As a result, for any increase in the inuence parameter from   to + the information structure P (v) is
not as e¢ cient as  (+; v) since then  > 0. In order to make  (
+; v) as e¢ cient as P we can consider
the information structure P ( v ) where 
 
v < v so that 
 
 v ; v; y; y; 
+

= 0. As a result any increase
in  reduces the e¢ ciency of the information structure .
Proof of Proposition 2. We denote P1 := (p

i1)i2f1;:::;4g the probability vector when the agent undertakes
the inuence activity in the context of inuence costs.
That is, P1 := (p

i1)i2f1;:::;4g =
26666664
(1  ) y[v + (1  v)]
(1  ) y(1  ) (1  v)
1  (1  ) y

[v + (1  v)]
1  (1  ) y

(1  ) (1  v)
37777775
and P0 := (p

i0)i2f1;:::;4g =
26666664
(1  )  1  y (1  v + v)
(1  )  1  y v(1  )
+ (1  ) y

(1  v + v)
+ (1  ) y

v(1  )
37777775
We then have that:8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
(11B) u
0 (w^1G) =
1
+(1  p

10
p11
)
(11B) u
0 (w^1B) =
1
+(1  p

20
p21
)
(10G) u
0 (w^0G) =
1
+(1  p

30
p31
)
(10B) u
0 (w^0B) =
1
+(1  p

30
p31
)
By taking derivatives and using simple algebra we get the results summarized in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3. It is optimal for the principal to design inuence-free contracts as long as:
R(y)+(w)P1 
 
wf

P1. Also, we know by using a very similar proof to the one presented for Proposition
3A that (w)P1 is increasing in both  and  and decreasing in the precision of both signals v and y. We
then conclude that as  increases not only inuence contracts tend to be more expansive but revenues will
also decrease (R(y) rises).
The cost of implementing the e¢ cient level of e¤ort in the case of inuence-free contracts depends on the
solution to the following optimization program:
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8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(1) w^f = min
wi2R4
(wf )P1
(2) u
 
wf

P1   C  u IR
(3) u
 
wf

P1   C  u
 
wf

P0 IC
(4) u
 
wf

P1  u
 
wf

P1 IF
We consider that the inuence-free constraint (IF) is binding, that is the e¢ cient contract w^R is not a
solution to the optimization problem with inuence. We denote IF = u
 
wf

(P1  P1). Also, by simple
algebra we get the following comparative statics:
i) @IF@ > 0, ii)
@IF
@ < 0, iii)
@IF
@v
> 0, iv) @IF@y > 0 for low values of  whereas
@IF
@y
< 0 for  high. As a
result, an increase in  will increase the costs of choosing inuence contracts since both R(y) and (w)P1
increase in  but also
 
wf

P1 decrease in  since the inuence-restriction becomes looser as  increases.
- We conclude that there exists a level f 2; (0; 1] above which the principal will always choose to design
inuence-free contracts. Indeed, for the upper bound  = 1 we know that inuence-free contracts are the
only solution since then the principal obtains no revenues from the agent.
- Also, as the ability of the worker increases the only part of the inequation that is a¤ected is R(y)
so that there exists a level of ability, say yf ; above which the principal will decide to design inuence-free
contracts.
- Concerning , there exist two opposite e¤ects. First an increase in  rises the costs of implementing
inuence contracts but at the same time it tends to render more attractive the inuence activity so that
@IF
@ < 0 meaning that inuence-free contracts become more costly as  rises.
Proof of Proposition 4. We need to solve the following optimization problem.8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(1) w^f = min
w2R4
(wf )P1
(2) u
 
wf

P1   e  u IR
(3) u
 
wf

P1   e  u
 
wf

P0 IC
(4) u
 
wf

P1  u
 
wf

P1 IF
We get the following rst order conditions, where  is the non-negative Lagrange multiplier associated
with restriction IF. It is easy to see that  > 0,  > 0 and  > 0 as long as w^R is not a solution to the
optimization problem.8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
(11G) u
0

w^f1G

=
yv
yv+(y+v 1)+(yv (1 )yv (1 )y(1 v))
(11B) u
0

w^f1B

=
(1 v)y
(1 v)y+(y v)+y(1 v)(1 (1 )(1 ))
(10G) u
0

w^f0G

=
(1 y)v
(1 y)v+(v y)+((1 y)v (1 (1 )y)(v+(1 v)))
(10B) u
0

w^f0B

=
(1 y)(1 v)
(1 y)(1 v)+(1 y v)+(1 v)(1 y (1 (1 )y)(1 ))
If we use the Implicit function theorem in these equations we can see that:
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8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
(11G)
@w^f1G
@ =  
(v 1)v2y( 1)
u00(w^f1G)((v 1)y( 1)+vy(+)+(y+v 1))2
< 0
(11B)
@w^f1B
@ =  
(v 1)22y( 1)
u00(w^f1B)(( 1)  )(v 1)y+(v y))2
> 0
(10G)
@w^f0G
@ =  
(v 1)v(1 y)2(1+y( 1))
u00(w^f0G)((v 1)(1+v(1 )) v+v( y(+)+))2
< 0
(10B)
@w^f0B
@ =  
(v 1)2(y 1)((y( 1)+1))
u00(w^f0B)((v 1)((1+y( 1))+ v(+))+(v+y 1))2
> 0
Similarly, we conclude after some algebra that:8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(11G)
@w^f1G
@ > 0 for  > 1, where 1 =
(1 v)
(1 )v+ .
(11B)
@w^f1B
@ > 0 for any  > 0.
(10G)
@w^f0G
@ < 0 for any  > 0.
(10B)
@w^f0B
@ < 0 for any  > 0, where 0 =
(1 y)
(1 )y .
We summarize these results as follows:
i) For  < f , there exists wage compression as the power of incentives decreases both in the hard and
the soft signal with respect to the inuence parameter .
ii) For   f , the power of incentives increases in the hard signal with respect to the the inuence
parameter .
iii) For  < 0  1 [ < 1 < 0], the power of incentives decreases in the soft signal with respect to
the inuence parameter :
iv) For   0 > 1 [ > 1  0], the power of incentives increases in the hard signal with respect to
the inuence parameter :
Proof of Corollary 2. It follows from the last proposition since for any   , there exists a level of
productivity R := R () such that high-productivity agents (R  R) gets an inuence-free contract whereas
low-productivity agents (R < R) get an inuence contract. Regarding the variance of wages one can see
the wage scheme as a mixed Bernoulli distribution with parameter  so that the variance of wages 2(w) in
that case is such that: 2(w) = 2(BG) + (1  )2(BB) +  (1  ) [E(BG)  E(BG)]2 where BG [BB ] is
the Bernoulli distribution that takes values w1G and w1B [w0G and w0B ] with probability y and
 
1  y

respectively. To show that 2(w) increase in  we are left to demonstrate that @@ [E(BG)  E(BG)]  0,
that is to show that y (w1G   w1B)+
 
1  y

(w0G   w0B) is increasing in . We know that as  increases
the (IF ) constraint is relaxed since costs of inuence increase for the agent and at the same time the power of
incentives in the hard signal increases in  as we have shown in the previous proposition. As a result, for (IF )
to be binding in equilibrium (it has to be the case since  > 0) it has to be that the benets associated with
inuence rise to compensate an increase in costs associated with the inuence activity previously mentioned.
That is, the power of incentives in the soft signal has to increase with regard to . This implies that both
(w1G   w1B) and (w0G   w0B) cannot decrease in . This completes the proof that 2(w) is increasing in
40
.
Proof of Corollary 3. This result follows from the results in Proposition 3 and Proposition 4. Notice
that free supervision may be detrimental for the principal as long as w^RNP1  minf
 
w^I

P1;
 
w^f

P1g. In
particular, for  = 1 we know that w^RNP1 = w^
RP1 and w^RP1 
 
w^f

P1. Also, for   f we know that 
w^f

P1 = argminf(w^)PI1;
 
w^f

P1g. As a result, w^RNP1  minf(w^)P1;
 
w^f

P1g for any   f and
for any   0, where 0 is such that w^RNP1   w^RP1 =
 
w^f

P1   w^RP1.
For  < f we know that (w^)P1 = argminf(w^)P1;
 
w^f

P1g. We know that (w^)P1 > w^RP1 for
any   1, where 1 is such that (w^)P1 = w^RNP1.
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